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How Ownership Structure Affects Capital Structure and 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Asian Crisis of the late 1990s has highlighted the problems of corporate 
governance among South East Asian corporations. While recent literature confirms 
aspects of concentrated ownership, dominance of controlling shareholders, separation 
of voting and cash flow rights and limited protection of minority rights in many of 
these countries badly affected by the Crisis (Claessens et al., 2000; 2002), a clear 
understanding  of  the  effects  of  ownership  structure  on  capital  structure  and  firm 
performance remains much unexplored. While Claessens et al. (2000) examine the 
pattern of ownership in seven East Asian countries, Claessens et al. (2002) investigate 
the effect of large shareholding on firm valuation. Lemmon and Lins (2003) further 
link  ownership  structure  to  stock  returns  in  these  countries.  None  of  these  recent 
studies however consider the effect of ownership structure on capital structure and 
firm  performance  and  the  possible  interaction  between  capital  structure  and  firm 
performance. As this paper will demonstrate, this is an important issue in the worst 
affected countries. In an attempt to fill in this gap of the literature, the paper examines 
how ownership structure may affect capital structure and performance of firms in 
South East Asian countries. In doing so, we not only allow for the possible non-
linearity  in  these  relationships,  but  also  correct  for  the  simultaneity  bias,  if  any, 
between capital structure and firm performance, often ignored in the literature. Our 
results confirm and extend the essential findings of Claessens et al. (2002) as well as 
Bajaj et al. (1998),  identifying different effects across different ownership structures, 
and highlighting the differences between Indonesia and Korea and thus make a case 
for  studying  these  countries  separately  rather  than  attempting  to  impose 
uniformpooling them together. 
Previous theoretical and applied literature has highlighted the complex nature 
of  the  relationships  between  ownership  structure,  capital  structure  and  firm 
performance. Existing literature highlights the agency problems between managers  
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and shareholders. In an attempt to ensure the continued viability of the firm, the latter 
may result in a generally lower leverage ratio below the optimum level. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) however argue that introduction of managerial share ownership may 
align  the  interests  of  managers  and  shareholders  and  thus  reduce  these  agency 
problems..
1 Extending this idea, Brailsford et al. (2002) suggest that the relationship 
between managerial share ownership and leverage may in fact be non-linear. Stulz 
(1988)  formalised  a concave  relationship  between  managerial  ownership  and  firm 
valuation too; with increase in managerial ownership and control, the negative effect 
on firm value associated with entrenchment (see discussion below) starts to exceed 
the  incentive  benefits  of  managerial  ownership  Empirically  Shleifer  and  Vishny, 
(1986) suggest that concentration of ownership may improve firm performance while 
Morck et al., (1988) argue that it may even deteriorate firm performance. 
Much of the existing literature is however based on the functioning of the US 
firms that traditionally tend to assume a wide dispersion in ownership structure than 
one finds in SE Asian countries.
2 A series of recent studies by Claessens et al. (2000, 
2002) however highlight the distinctive pattern of ownership structure in East Asia. 
East Asian corporations are often dominated by large family owners and are often 
characterised by concentration of ownership as well as the presence of a CEO, Board 
Chairman or Vice Chairman who is also a controlling shareholder of the company 
(labelled as Cronyman hereafter). Ownership is also characterised by the separation of 
voting  rights  from  cash  flow  rights  where  control  rights  (or  voting  rights)  of  the 
largest owners were often generally greater than the corresponding cash flow rights 
prior to the crisis. It is clear that higher voting rights may give rise to serious agency 
problems,  and  are  often  associated  with  pyramid  ownership  structures,  and 
crossholding. Such  situations  are associated  with an over-reliance  on debt, due  to 
large shareholders being unwilling to dilute their ownership. This scenario is refereed 
to as non-dilution of entrenchment by Claessens et al. (2002). Further, the separation 
of voting rights from cash flow rights increases the likelihood of misallocation of 
resources, which in turn is likely to adversely affect the performance of the firm, and 
in turn its value.  
                                                 
1 Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985) went further to claim that the level of optimal managerial 
ownership is firm-specific and endogenous to expected performance. 
2 Recent evidence however tends to highlight a substantial degree of ownership concentration including 
family ownership in large firms around the world (e.g., see, Morck (2005); Burkart et al. (2003). Such 
arguments are supported by large scale studies such as La Porta et al. (1999) as well.   
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The distinction between owners and managers may however be blurred in the 
case  of  family  firms,  as  it  is  common  for  family  members  to  be  employed  as 
managers. In such cases, standard analysis of the conflict of interests between owners 
and  managers  in  the  presence  of  dispersed  ownership  may  not  apply,  though 
dominance of family members may still give rise to conflict of interests with minority 
shareholders. In addition, family ownership may give rise to greater leverage than in 
the case of disperse ownership, because raising debt does not dilute the position of the 
controlling shareholder (non-dilution of entrenchment effects). Anderson et al. (JFE, 
2003) further argue that family ownership reduces the cost of debt financing. The 
divergence of interests between family shareholders (owner) and debt holders (banks) 
is potentially less severe than between diversified shareholders and debt holders. This 
is because families represent a special class of large shareholders that potentially have 
unique incentive structures and motives to manage a firm. Families are different from 
other shareholders in at least two respects including family's interest in the long-term 
survival and also its   concern for the firm reputation. In addition, banks often develop 
personal and well-informed relationships with family executives, suggesting that the 
family's presence allows these relationships to build over a number of years. 
Family ownership is however found to be closely associated with presence of 
Cronyman, higher control than cash flow rights and also concentrated ownership. It is 
the possible to envisage how the dominance of certain individuals, or families will 
lead  to  the  problems  of  excessive  borrowing  and  over-investment  that  typically 
characterised  the Asian crisis of the late 1990s. However, the precise link between 
the  prevalent  ownership  structure  and  over  borrowing/firm  performance  remains 
unexplored in the existing literature. In this paper, we attempt to unravel the complex 
interactions between ownership structure, capital structure and firm performance in 
two of the worst affected countries, namely, Indonesia and Korea.   
This paper is then distinctive in a number of ways. The theoretical basis of the 
link between ownership structure, capital structure and firm performance is primarily 
derived from Bajaj, Chan and Dasgupta, (1998), that allows for both moral hazard and 
adverse  selection  problems  in  firm  financing.  This  framework  hypothesizes  that  
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ownership and the degree of monitoring
3, both determined exogenously, will impact 
on  capital  structure  and  firm  performance.  In  the  light  of  our  specific  sample 
characteristics, we however empirically extend Bajaj et al. (1998) in a number of 
ways.  Firstly,  we  highlight  the  case  of  family  firms  where  often  the  controlling 
manager is the member of the same family. We argue that this kind of ownership 
structure would mitigate the moral hazard problem
4, at least to some extent, because 
the  family  members  would  gain  from  better  firm  performance  (though  it  may 
exacerbate  the problem  of  over lending).  Secondly,  we allow for  the  simultaneity 
between capital structure and firm performance, often ignored in the literature, but 
recently  highlighted  by  Berger  and  di  Patti  (2003).  Ignoring  this  important 
simultaneity could however bias the effects of ownership on capital structure and firm 
performance (see section 5). Indeed there is evidence that effects of ownership cannot 
be separated from its effect on leverage. Finally, as Stulz (1988) and Brailsford et al. 
(2002)  suggest  that  there  could  be  important  non-linearities  in  the  effects  of 
ownership on capital structure and firm performance, which is not accounted for by 
Bajaj et al. (1998). In view of initial non-parametric analyses of our samples, we 
however  allow  for  nonlinearities  in  the  relationships  between  ownership 
concentration, capital structure and firm performance. This is a crucial aspect of our 
analysis,  especially  when  one  considers  the  potential  importance  of  majority 
shareholdings, and the potential threshold effects of different levels of concentration 
(51% for example) on capital structure and firm performance. The importance of these 
issues is demonstrated in terms of both parametric and non-parametric analyses.  
The analysis here is based on two of the countries most deeply affected by the 
crisis, Indonesia and Korea. These countries provide an interesting contrast, given 
their distinctive corporate histories and different levels of capital market development 
(for further discussion on this see Chelley-Steeley, 2004). These differences suggest 
potentially  differing  impacts  of  different  ownership  and  governance  structures  on 
capital structure and firm performance.  
The  paper  is  developed  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  the  data  and  its 
characteristic  features,  highlighting  the  nonparametric  relationships  between 
                                                 
3 While ownership concentration is of course important, and directly available, we also consider more 
subtle indicators of ownership structure, including family ownership and separation of voting rights 
from cash flow rights. This is discussed in more detail in sections 2 and 3. 
4 Our analysis explicitly controls for one possible source of moral hazard as proxied by whether voting 
rights exceed cash flow rights.  
  6 
ownership structure, capital structure and firm performance in our samples. Section 3 
builds  up  the  analytical  framework  while  section  4  translates  the  analytics  into 
empirics. Section 5 presents and analyses the results and the final section concludes.  
 
 
2.  DATA AND PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
We  examine  the  effect  of  ownership  structure  on  capital  structure  and  corporate 
leverage among listed non-financial companies in Indonesia and Korea. Data used for 
this  analysis  come  from  two  sources.  Firm-level  accounting  data  extracted  from 
Worldscope 2002 is matched with 1996 ownership data for these firms described in 
Claessens et al. (2002). La Porta et al (1999) demonstrate that ownership structures in 
these firms are very stable over time
5; thus without much loss of generality we assume 
that ownership pattern remained more or less stable among sample firms over the 




2.1. Ownership Structure 
The differences in ownership structures among firms in these countries are illustrated 
in Table 1A and Table 1B.  
  As  is  well-documented,  family  ownership  is  the  predominant  form  of 
ownership in both sample countries. 75% of Indonesian firms, and 79% of Korean 
firms  in  our  samples  are  family  owned,  with  the  remainder  being  state  owned, 
(Indonesia: 8%; Korea: 5%) or more dispersed patterns of ownership.  
Secondly, management is rarely separated from ownership control. In nearly 
70% of firms in both countries the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Board Chairman 
or Vice-chairman was also a controlling owner. This is labelled as Cronyman in our 
analysis. Perhaps not surprisingly, both countries exhibit a close association between 
family  ownership  and  presence  of  a  Cronyman.  90%  of  family  owned  firms  in 
                                                 
5 This assertion is supported by Bajaj et al. (1998).  
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Indonesia  are  characterised  by  the  presence  of  such  an  individual,  while  the 
corresponding proportion for Korea is about 77%.  In contrast, presence of Cronyman 
is rather low among the non-family owned firms in both countries, particularly so in 
Indonesia.  
The separation  of  voting rights from cash flow rights is another important 
feature of East Asian corporations. In particular, voting rights are higher in more than 
half  of  the  Indonesian  firms  (the  corresponding  proportion  is  about  25%  among 
Korean firms). More interestingly, there is a close association between presence of 
Cronyman and higher voting rights in both countries: more than 90% of Cronyman 
firms in both countries exhibit voting rights in excess of cash flow rights.  
  The distribution of concentration of ownership among top five shareholders 
clearly varies in the two countries. The average level of concentration is higher in 
Indonesia, with the top five shareholders holding more than 50% of shares in 47% of 
Indonesian firms but only 6% of Korean firms. Equally, in just under half the Korean 
firms, the top five shareholders account for less than 25% of holdings, while in only 
3% of Indonesian firms do the top five shareholders account for less than 25% of the 
equity. There is however no significant difference in the level of concentration among 
family  firms  and  widely-held  firms  in  our  samples  though  the  average  is  again 
significantly lower in Korea (27% as against 47% in Indonesia).  
This  initial  analysis  clearly  reveals  the  complex  nature  of  the  ownership 
structure in the selected countries, especially in view of the observed close association 
between  family  ownership,  presence  of  Cronyman,  concentration,  and  also higher 
voting than cash flow rights. The question that is commonly ignored in this literature, 
is therefore how the observed ownership structure affects capital structure and firm 
performance, after allowing for the simultaneity. This is discussed in more detail in 
sections 3 and 4. 
 
2.2. Capital Structure 
The key indicator of capital structure in our analysis is leverage, or debt-equity ratio, 
defined as total debt divided by book value of common equity. It is possible in this 
context for debt-equity ratios to be negative, as in some cases firms exhibit negative 
values of equity. In order to avoid this we employ the absolute value of the debt- 
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equity ratio in our analysis.  
In order to illustrate the changes in leverage through the period of the crisis, 
Table 2A shows the share of low debt-equity firms (firms relying more on equity 
financing) in Korea and Indonesia, for the period in the run up to the crisis (1994-
1996) and  the  crisis period (1997-98). We also include a “base”  year  (1993), for 
comparison. For comparison, we also consider the corresponding proportion of low 
leverage firms in Singapore, a country that remained least affected by the crisis. In 
comparison to 22% Korean and 59% Indonesian firms, as high as 84% of firms in 
Singapore relied more on equity financing during 1994-96 (Table 2).
6  Demirguc-kunt 
and Maksimovic (1995) suggest that the over-reliance on debt in the worst affected 
countries, especially Korea, can be partially explained by the relatively low levels of 
stock market development in the country.  
 
2.3. Ownership and capital structure 
Table  3  summarises  the  average  leverage  values  for  different  types  of  ownership 
structure in the two countries. Leverage rates in Indonesia were lower than Korea at 
the start of the period, across all categories. However, the data also show clearly that 
increases in leverage through the crisis were far more marked for Indonesia, with 
Korean firms increasing leverage rates but at a less dramatic rate. The highest level of 
ownership concentration (>50%) in Korea exhibited the highest levels of leverage in 
the pre-crisis period, but in Indonesia this was in the firms in the medium range of 
concentration. The presence of a Cronyman is also associated with higher levels of 
leverage  in  both  countries  while  higher  voting  rights  seem  to  give  rise  to  higher 
leverage in Indonesia, but not for Korea.  
In order to examine this further, we present some nonparametric Kernel scatter 
plots (see Figures 1, 2) to illustrate the non-linearity in the relationship between levels 
of ownership concentration and capital structure in both countries. The non-linearity 
appears particularly significant for Indonesian firms. This nonparametric analysis is 
indicative  of  a  u-shaped  relationship  between  concentration  and  leverage  for 
Indonesian firms, for both sub-periods 94-96 and 97-98. In other words, lower levels 
                                                 
6 These figures contrast with Singapore, one of the least affected countries, which relies far more 
heavily on equity finance.  
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of concentration are associated with lower levels of leverage as existing shareholders 
are  less  concerned  about  the  dilution  of  their  dominance.  At  a  higher  level  of 
concentration, leverage increases (the trend is more obvious if we exclude the outlier 
firm with concentration level of 73%) because of the fear of dilution of dominance of 
large  controlling  shareholders.  The  u-shaped  relationship  is  however  not  so 
pronounced for Korea. However, firms with ownership concentration in excess of 
45%, exhibit higher levels of leverage, though in general non-linearity is much less 
obvious  during  the  crisis  period  where  firms  with  high  concentration  exhibit  a 
marginal fall in leverage.  
 
2.3. Ownership and firm performance 
Our indicator of performance is the pre-tax profit margin. Table 3 shows the average 
levels of profit margin associated with different types of ownership structure for the  
pre-crisis  (1994-96)  and  the  crisis  (1997-98)  periods.  The  data  show  a  general 
deterioration of firm performance over the period. There is a weak positive relation 
between average profit margins and concentration for Korea in the pre-crisis period, 
though the reverse is apparent for Indonesia. These non-parametric analyses suggest 
only a weak relationship between profit margins and the other indicators of ownership 
structure  for Indonesian firms, and a marginally stronger one for Korea.  
Again the nonparametric kernel scatter plots are informative (see the middle 
panels in Figures 1, 2). While there is no obvious non-linearity in this respect for 
Indonesia (more or less uniform performance with higher levels of concentration), one 
can  observe  some  degree  of  non-linearity  in  the  relationship  for  Korean  firms, 
particularly for the crisis period. More specifically, firm performance is lower among 
firms with concentration levels between 30% and 50% though higher beyond these 
points and the trend is rather similar across the two time periods.  
   
 
3. ANALYTICAL ARGUMENTS 
This section outlines the analytical framework used to rationalise the possible effects 
of  ownership  structure  on  capital  structure  and  firm  performance  in  a  world  
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characterised both by adverse selection and moral hazard problems of firm financing.   
  An understanding of the conflict of interests between managers and owners, 
i.e.,  agency  problems,  remains  central  to  the  analysis  of  the  relationship  between 
ownership structure, capital structure and firm performance. This analysis dates back 
to the classic work of Jensen and Meckling, (1976) and Leland and Pyle (1977). More 
recently,  Bajaj,  Chan  and  Dasgupta  (1998)  extend  Leland  and  Pyle  (1977)  and 
develop a signalling model to show how both adverse selection and moral hazard may 
interact to determine firms’ financing decisions and performance measures in terms of 
ownership structure. This theoretical work is particularly relevant for our empirical 
analysis as it allows us to derive both capital structure and firm performance in terms 
of  ownership structure (assumed to be exogenous). Ownership structure is captured in 
terms of managerial share ownership that addresses the traditional agency conflict 
between  manager  and  the  shareholder  (a  la  Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976).    Thus 
without any loss of generality, we proceed to make use of Bajaj et al. (1998).  
 
3.1. Modelling Framework  
Bajaj  et  al.  (1998)  consider  the  investment  and  financing  behaviour  of  an 
entrepreneur/manager who owns the rights to a production technology, but needs to 
raise investment capital by selling some combination of equity and debt. Financial 
returns to the manger are fully captured by the share ownership of the firm (his/her 
initial  wealth  is  assumed  to  be  zero).  The  technology  is  characterised  by  the 
production function f(k)(µ+ε) where k denotes investment and ε is a random variable 
with a  mean of zero and a known distribution. The parameter µ is a measure of the 
productivity (or profitability) of the firm’s technology, which is only known to the 
manager (who is risk-averse); the market (assumed to be risk-neutral) cannot however 
directly observe this.  
The  analysis  covers  a  single  period  from  point  0  (when  production  and 
financing decisions are made) to the point 1 (when output is realised). At point 0, the 
manager  announces  a  public  offering  for  (1-α)  fraction  of  equity  claims.  Upon 
learning α the market values the equity of the firm as S(α) = S(µ’(α)), using an 
inference schedule µ’(α). Eventually the firm obtains (1-α) S(α) for the equity. Thus 
the financing constraint is given by: k= (1-α) S(α) + D. After paying the debt-holders,  
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managers are left with some residual cash flow given by RCF = f(k)(µ+ε)– F, where F 
is the risk-free face value of debt given by (1+r) D.  
  It  is  assumed  that  manager’s  compensation  is  determined  not  only  by  the 
fraction of the equity they retain, but also by their ability to divert cash flows for 
perquisite  consumption;  the  latter  captures  how  moral  hazard  too  can  affect  the 
relationships  of  our  interest.  In  particular,  in  the  absence  of  a  perfect  monitoring 
technology, the manager diverts a fraction γ of the residual cash flow for perquisite 
consumption; thus a higher value of γ could reflect a lower value of monitoring.  
The  simple  cross-sectional  implications  of  the  model  are  pertinent  for  our 
analysis. Denoting indices of capital structure and firm performance by Y1 and Y2 
















       (1) 
Thus each endogenous variable Yki , k = 1,2, for the i-th firm, i = 1,…,nj in the j-th 




3.2. Central Hypotheses 
It follows that ownership
7 is positively correlated with (a) various measures of the 
debt-equity ratio and (b) also with indices of firm performance.
8 With the degree of 
moral hazard (γ) unchanged, various measures of debt-equity ratios increases with 
managerial ownership. This is because as the firm sells less equity (higher α being 
retained by the manager), it relies more on debt financing (via the financing constraint 
                                                 
7 Here ownership is defined as managerial shareholding.  
8 Zhang (1998) too argues that a controlling large shareholder is more averse to risky projects (due to 
under-diversification, which is also the opportunity cost of concentrated ownership) than shareholders 
whose portfolios are fully diversified. The latter may result in under-investment by rejecting projects 
preferred by the minority shareholders. This under-investment problem can however be mitigated by 
issuing debt since the ‘risk-shifting’ effect of debt offsets the under-investment incentive of the under-
diversified owner. Thus a firm’s leverage increases with concentrated  ownership, and this relation 
becomes stronger the more risk-averse the controlling shareholder is.  
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equation).  Because  in  the  signalling  equilibrium  managers  of  higher  productivity 
firms retain more shares, they have to use higher leverage, especially if these firms 
invest more relative to the lower productivity firms. 
For a given value of γ, higher managerial ownership (α) is associated with 
higher net present value as well as higher firm valuation. This operates through a 
trade-off between the risk-aversion effect and productivity effect. The risk-aversion 
effect refers to the incentive of a risk averse manager to reduce his / her holding as the 
financial risk of the firm increases, The productivity effect however suggests that as 
the  productivity  of  the  firm  increases,  so  does  the  incentive  to  concentrated 
ownership. It has been argued that for all types of firms (low and high productivity 
firms  taken  together),  higher  managerial  ownership  is  associated  with  higher  net 
present value of investment because of higher productivity effect. In other words, 
higher investment leads to higher market value net of perquisite consumption when 
managerial ownership increases in this model.  
The  monitoring  parameter  γ  is  also  important  here.  This  will  impact  on 
leverage and firm valuation differently. With profitability µ unchanged, leverage is an 
increasing function of the degree of moral hazard γ (in both absolute and relative 
terms). An increase in γ lowers the value of equity because it is associated with a 
larger diversion of RCF. Also an increase in γ lowers the scale of investment, though 
the reduction in investment is lower than the reduction in equity valuation. Thus debt 
has to increase in both absolute and relative terms to balance the budget (no pre-
commitment though).
9 If however outside monitoring is less effective, managers have 
an incentive to under-lever the firm to avoid bankruptcy risk (e.g., see Mehran, 1992). 
Thus,  the  value  of  the  firm  will be a decreasing  function  of  the degree  of moral 
hazard. This is because investment level moves away from the optimal level and as 





                                                 
9 This result is also consistent with the agency view of Jensen (1986) that in the presence of free cash 
flow, pre-commitment to higher debt is value increasing.  
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4.  From Analytics to Empirics 
In  view  of  the  distinctive  characteristics  of  our  samples,  we  shall  in  this  section 
attempt to translate the analytical arguments into an empirical exercise.  
Our discussion in sections 1 and 2 summarises the significant characteristics of 
the ownership structure in East Asia. Firstly, while there are variations in ownership 
structures across firms, following La Porta et al. (1999) and Bajaj et al. (1998), we 
consider these to be stable over time. We however need to allow for the fact that we 
have a sample of panel nature where we observe firms over a period of five years 
1994-98. This in turn means that our ownership variables do not vary over time (as is 
indicated by Bajaj et al., 1998), though most other firm-level variables tend to vary 
over  time  and  across  firms.  Secondly,  we  do  not  directly  observe  the  managerial 
shareholding in our data, but reckon that the binary information on the presence of a 
Cronyman is the closest proxy for the presence of a controlling manager in our data. 
We also note that presence of a Cronyman is predominant in family owned firms. 
Thus  our  analysis  focuses  on  the  family  firms  with  Cronyman  and  compares  the 
behaviour of these firms with others. Thirdly, it is difficult to find an appropriate 
measure of the degree of monitoring. Various proxies have been used in the existing 
literature, e.g., percentage  of outside directors  (Mehran, 1992),  shareholder voting 
rights  (Lippert  and  Moore)  or  control  potential  (e.g.,  measured  by  institutional 
ownership,  as  in  Mehran,  1995).  Given  the  limited  ownership  information  at  our 
disposal, we could possibly use two indices to instrument the degree of monitoring in 
our model; first, if control rights are greater than the cash flow rights and also if the 
largest share holder is a family (family ownership). When a large shareholder keeps 
significant control rights with relatively small cash flow rights, s/he has little stake in 
firm value and can get away despite taking reckless policies undermining the interests 
of the company and giving rise to a kind of moral hazard problem. Similar problem 
may arise with a family ownership, especially if it is associated with higher voting 
rights. Thus in these cases market forces such as the product market (Hart 1983) or 
the  corporate  control  market  (Stulz  1988)  may  fail  to  discipline  the  controlling 
shareholder towards firm value maximisation. In addition, Zhang (1998) suggested 
that higher concentration of ownership in the hands of a few holders may lead to 
slower  response  to  changing  market  conditions  due  to  a  lack  of  professional 
monitoring mechanism. Secondly, a higher level of ownership concentration may be  
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an indication of an environment where it is costly to conduct control-related activities. 
Thus the level of ownership concentration could also indirectly account for the lack of 
monitoring of the activities of minority of controlling shareholders. 
 
 4.1. Empirical Relationships  
4.1.1. Ownership and Capital Structure 
Leverage among sample firms may increase or decrease with the level of ownership 
concentration as has been reflected in a kind of u-shaped relationship in this respect 
(e.g., see the non-parametric Kernel scatter plots in Figures 1, 2 and discussion in 
section 2).  The u-shaped relationship is particularly pronounced for the Indonesian 
firms such that at lower level of concentration, shareholders may make use more of 
outside equity (resulting in a lower leverage) since they would not be concerned about 
the dilution of their dominance. The relationship however seems to change as we 
move  to  higher  level  of  concentration  when  leverage  level  increases  with  further 
increases  in  levels  of  concentration  possibly  because  of  the  non-dilution  of  the 
entrenchment  effect.  Similar  effect  is  also  noted  among  Korean  firms  though  it 
remains less pronounced. 
Thus the relationship between ownership structure and capital structure (DE) 
for firm i in year t can be expressed as follows:  
) 2 ( %) 50 ( ) ( 1 1 4 3 2 1 0 it it i i i it u Voting Concen Concen DE X + + + > + + = α α α α α  
     
We experimented with different combinations of ownership variables and also with 
different cut-off points  for the  ownership  concentration  variables (to capture non-
linearity; see further discussion in section 4). Equation 2 turns out to be the most 
parsimonious specification for determining leverage in terms of ownership structure. 
Here X1it refer to other possible control variables (see discussion later in this section) 
and the residual error term is u1it. Voting is a binary variable taking a value 1 if voting 
rights of the largest shareholder is higher than the cash flow rights.  
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 4.1.2. Ownership and Firm Performance 
The link between ownership structure and firm performance has been the subject of an 
on-going debate going back to Berle and Means (1932), who suggested that firms 
with a wide dispersal of shares tend to under-perform. In general, a positive relation 
between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is predicted and many studies 
have confirmed this (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Short, 1994; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 
1998; Thomsen & Pederson, 2000; Gorton & Schmidt, 1996; Kang and Shivadasani, 
1995) Some studies have however contradicted this general finding (see, for example, 
Demsetz  and  Lehn,  1985  and  Morck  et  al.  1988).  Much  of  the  variation  in  this 
literature appears attributable to the difficulties in obtaining a uniform measure of 
firm performance. However, it is also clear that much of this literature fails to control 
for variations in ownership structure and also the potential endogeneity problems.  
  Firm  performance  (Π)  in  our  analysis  is  measured  by  the  pre  tax  profit 
margin.
10  In  constructing  a  standard  model  of  firm  performance  based  on  the 
industrial  economics  literature,  one  would  include  numerous  variables  relating  to 
market  structure,  such  as  industry  concentration,  in  order  to  allow  for  inter-firm 
variation in profits generated through inter-industry variation. However, such data that 
can be matched in with these data are not available, so it is necessary to remove the 
industry level variation from the data. We therefore calculate the firm level deviation 
of  firm  profit  (pre  and  post  tax)  from  the  corresponding  within-sample  industry 
mean
11 and specify two possible profit functions as follows:  
) 3 ( %) 50 ( ) ( 2 2 4 3 2 1 0 it it i i i it u Voting Concen Concen X + + + > + + = Π β β β β β              
As with equation 2, equation 3 is also the most parsimonious profit functions that we 
had identified after testing of alternatives against one another. Here X2it captures all 
other possible factors and u2it are the residual error term.  
 
4.1.3. Other Explanatory Variables 
In  addition  to  indicators  of  ownership  pattern,  leverage  and  firm  performance,  a 
                                                 
10 The analysis was also carried out using post-tax profit margin and obtained similar results.  
11 In section 5 we present the estimates using profit margin in deviation form. We however find that 
estimates using profit margin with industry dummies are very similar to those using profit margin as 
deviation from industry mean.    
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number of other control variables are included in both leverage and profit margin 
equations. 
Firm size: Firm size is measured by the log of total sales. Firm size may be 
positively (Friend and Lang, 1988; Marsh, 1982) or negatively (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995) related to leverage. Large firms may exercise economies of scale, have better 
knowledge of markets and are able to employ better managers. Large size may enable 
greater  specialisation.  It  may  also  measure  a  firm's  market  power  or  the  level  of 
concentration in the industry. On the other hand, however, relatively large firms can 
be less efficient than smaller ones, because of the loss of control by top managers over 
strategic and operational activities (Himmelberg et. al 1999, Williamson 1967). Also 
as Jensen (1986) notes professional managers of a firm (who are not the owners) 
derive personal benefits from expanding beyond the optimal size of the firm by their 
desire to have, among others, power and status. The latter may increase leverage and 
lower firm efficiency. 
Tobin’s  Q  value:  This  is  a  proxy  for  growth  opportunities.  The  trade-off 
theory predicts that firms with more opportunities carry less leverage. The traditional 
version of the pecking order theory predicts the opposite result. Debt typically grows 
when retained earnings are less than investment requirement and vice-versa. Hence, 
for a given level of profitability, leverage is likely to be higher for firms with more 
growth/investment opportunities.   
Age  of  the  firm:  Firm  performance  may  depend  on  the  accumulated 
knowledge about  the  market, experience and firm’s reputation.  Hence, one  would 
expect a positive relationship between age and profit margin. Old firms however, may 
be  less  open  to  new  technology  as  well  as  more  rigid  in  terms  of  style  and 
effectiveness  of  managerial  governance.  This  may  result  in  a  negative  relation 
between the  age and performance  of  the firm.  As for capital  structure, old firms, 
particularly in East Asian countries, are likely to have developed close links with their 
lenders and hence may be able to acquire debt more easily and at a cheaper rate, 
resulting in a positive relationship between the age and leverage of the firm. 
Diversification: A firm is classified as diversified if it operates in more than 
three market segments, each accounting for more than 10% of the total revenue of the 
firm. Diversified firms may enjoy higher profits as a result of combining activities  
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such as production, distribution, marketing and research. The transaction cost theory 
(Williamson  1975)  and  imperfect  external  capital  markets  provide  a  rationale  for 
firms  to  diversify.  A  different  strand  of  this  literature,  however,  argues  that 
diversification has a negative  effect on  firm performance  since diversified firm  is 
prone  to  cross-subsidise  investments  poor  growth  opportunities  (Berger  and  Ofek 
1995)  and  the  distortions  in  investment  decisions  can  occur  in  the  presence  of 
managerial  power  struggle  among  the  firm's  various  diversified  divisions  (Rajan, 
Servaes, and Zingales 2000). Empirically diversified firms do not appear to perform 
better  and  the  causation  tends  to  run  from  low  performance  resulting  in  a 
diversification of a firm. Inconclusive empirical evidence on this issue also suggests 
that managers may have objectives other than maximising profits, such as the growth 
of revenue, that lead firms to become diversified. As for capital structure, Lewellen 
(1971) argues that diversified firms enjoy greater debt capacity. Also if diversified 
firms have more stable cash flows, this is likely to have a positive impact on the 
supply of debt. 
There are also  some identifying  variables in leverage and profit equations, 
given respectively by equations (2) and (3)s. This becomes particularly evident as we 
introduce  simultaneity  between  leverage  and  profit  equations  (4)  and  (5).  This  is 
discussed in the following subsection.    
 
 
4.2. Simultaneity between Capital Structure and Firm Performance 
Based on the theoretical literature in section 3, agency problems are important in 
determining not only ownership structures but also capital structures. The Alternative 
capital structures will mitigate against different agency problems within signalling 
models on which our analysis is based. High leverage may reduce the agency costs of 
outside equity, and increase firm value by encouraging managers to act more in the 
interests of shareholders. Most existing literature in this area seeks to investigate the 
relation between profits (internal finance) and the choice between debt and equity 
(external finance). This however tends to be within a single equation approach, thus 
ignoring the potential simultaneity in the determination of profits and leverage. This is 
perhaps  surprising  when  one  considers  the  large  literature  that  is  concerned  with  
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determining the optimal capital structure at the firm level, see for example Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), or Roberts (2002) and the literature discussed therein. 
Berger and di Patti (2003) offer two hypotheses for the reverse causation from 
performance to capital structure. First, more efficient firms choose lower equity ratios 
than others, all else equal, because higher efficiency reduces the expected costs of 
bankruptcy and financial distress. The second hypothesis focuses on the income effect 
of the economic rents generated by efficiency (as an indicator of performance) on the 
choice of leverage. Thus more efficient firms choose higher equity capital ratios, all 
else equal, to protect the rents or franchise value associated with high efficiency from 
the  possibility  of  liquidation.  Prior  evidence  supports  the  notion  that  firms  hold 
additional equity capital to protect franchise value (e.g., Keeley, 1990).  
If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure and vice versa, then 
the  failure  to  take  this  into  account  may  result  in  serious  simultaneity  bias,  with 
important implications for pattern of firm financing and performance. In the light of 
the two-way relationship between capital structure and firm efficiency, one needs to 
allow  for  the  simultaneity  between  capital  structure  and  firm  performance.  Thus 
equations (2) and (3) are modified as follows: 
it it it
it i i i it
u PFT PFT
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                (4) 
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                    (5) 
 
As  argued  above,  firms  with  higher  profit  margins  may  substitute  outside  equity 
capital for debt. On the other hand it may also be true that more efficient firms try to 
protect the value of their high income by holding more equity capital. The estimated 
coefficient of profit in the leverage equation would capture the net value of these two 
possible and opposite effects.   
  19 
As indicated above, one may also expect some non-linearity in the effects of 
firm efficiency on capital structure so that firms at a higher level of efficiency may 
behave differently from those at a lower level. Since we are not sure about the nature 
of this non-linearity, we experimented with a few alternatives, namely, (a) inclusion 
of an additional square term of efficiency measure; (b) replacing efficiency measure 
by its log (natural) and (c) inclusion of an additional inverse term of the efficiency 
measure.  In  the  end,  inclusion  of  a  square  term  of  profit  margin  worked  best  in 
comparison to other alternatives as is highlighted in equation 4. 
  The agency cost hypothesis would predict that an increase in leverage raises 
efficiency.  Some  may  however  argue  that  there  is  a  possible  non-linearity  in  the 
effects  of  leverage  on  profit  margin  as  a  measure  of  firm  efficiency  as  well.  In 
particular, when leverage is sufficiently high, further increases may result in lower 
efficiency because the benefits in terms of reduced agency costs of outside equity are 
overcome  by  greater  agency  costs  of  debt.  Our  initial  analysis  in  terms  of  non-
parametric scatter plots (Figure 1, 2) in section 2 does not however suggest any non-
linearity; hence in the final analysis we refrain from introducing any non-linearity in 
the  effects  of  capital  structure  on  profit  margin.  This  is  an  important  difference 
between the leverage and profit equations, after allowing for simultaneity.   
 
4.3. Econometric Considerations 
Given  that  ownership  information  is  available  only  for  the  year  1996,  we  could 
construct a cross-section data-set for the period 1996-1998. This would mean that 
there  will  be  a  single  observation  for  each  firm  such  that  leverage  and  firm 
performance relate to the average values of these variables for the period while all 
other  variables  correspond  to  the  initial  year  1996.  There  are  at  least  two 
disadvantages with this kind of data-set. First, the single cross-section data cannot 
capture the aspect of time variation for a particular firm, if any. For one thing, the 
relationship between capital structure and firm performance is more pertinent for a 
given  firm  over  time  rather  than among  the  cross-section  of  the  firms.  Secondly, 
1996-98 period could be quite destabilising for the corporate sector in these countries 
when the crisis was in full fledge. Thus by focusing on the crisis period only, we may 
lose sight of some significant behavioural patterns among these Asian corporations.  
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Thus, we make use of the annual panel data-set for the period 1994-98, which we 
believe would capture the behavioural transition of these corporations better from pre-
crisis years into the crisis. 
  An  important  issue  here  relates  to  the  potential  endogeneity  of  ownership 
highlighted by Demsetz (1983). Empirical evidence does not however  corroborate 
this. For example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) used two stage least square (treating 
ownership as potentially endogenous) to find that ownership fails to explain variations 
in firm performance, which is further confirmed by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) 
and Cho (1998). On the other hand, Morck et al. (1988) and other studies ignored the 
issue of endogeneity of ownership structure and produce evidence of a statistically 
significant effect of ownership structure on performance. Thus without much loss of 
generality, we treat ownership structure to be exogenously given. In any case, given 
that  our  ownership  information  is  available  only  for  1996,  following  Bajaj  et  al. 
(1998) and La Porta et al. (1999), we assume ownership structure to be rather stable 
over time in our sample.  This allows us to focus directly on the issues of our interest, 
i.e., to reinvestigate the relationship between capital structure and firm performance in 
terms of ownership structure, among others, allowing for the simultaneity and non-
linearity between capital structure and firm performance. 
Although,  we  have  theoretically  rationalised  the  simultaneity  between  
leverage and performance, it is still important to test the hypothesis explicitly. Strictly, 
this involves testing for endogeneity in the variables, using a standard Hausman test. 
In  all  sub  samples,  and  all  models  discussed  above  exogeneity  of  leverage  in 
performance (equation 5), and performance in leverage (equation 4) is rejected. This 
therefore  means  that  the  standard  “within”  panel  data  determination  of  capital 
structure and firm performance that is reported elsewhere in the literature is invalid. 
While it is trivial to correct for the potential endogeneity with instrumental variables 
estimation, a preferred strategy is to jointly estimate equations (4) and (5), allowing 
for simultaneity between capital structure and firm efficiency. While the use of panel 
data to estimate systems of simultaneous equations is well understood, this generally 
involves converting the data to differences and estimate the system by either three 
stage least squares (3SLS) or generalised methods of moments (GMM) using lagged 
values as instruments to generate orthogonality conditions on differenced data. This is 
a straightforward simultaneous equations estimator following Holtz-Eakin et al (1988)  
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or Cornwell et al (1992), which allows for individual effects both within individual 
equations and  in the covariance matrix between the equations, based on the more 
general approach of Arrellano and Bond (1988, 1991) or the more recent Blundell and 
Bond (1998) GMM systems estimator. It still relies on employing lags as instruments; 
so  with  short  panels  of  unbalanced  data  such  estimation  reduces  the  number  of 
observations  dramatically.  However,  the  essential  problem  here  is  that  the  data 
contain time-invariant variables. As such, one cannot adopt one of these approaches, 
as differencing the data becomes infeasible. We therefore adopt the 3SLS “within” 
estimation  with  error  components  suggested  by  Baltagi  and  Li  (1992),  based  on 
Baltagi (1981). In practice this involves estimating equations (4) and (5), for example, 
separately using a standard “within estimator”
12, and then calculating the covariance 
matrix  between  the  equations  using  the  errors.  The  data  are  then  transformed  by 
dividing through by the square root of the covariance, and finally equations (4) and 
(5) are estimated by 3SLS employing the transformed data. As the use of 3sls over 
2sls implies further restrictions in the model, these restrictions can be tested again 
using a standard Hausman F test, and in all cases these restrictions are not rejected.  
A  final  consideration  is  the  issue  of  stability  of  coefficients  across  firms, 
which again is often ignored in this literature. As is outlined above, a high proportion 
of firms in SE Asia are family owned, with high concentrations of voting rights. There 
is however a significant group of firms that do not conform to this pattern. Given the 
issues that this paper seeks to address, the relationship between ownership, leverage 
and  performance,  one  must  consider  whether  any  model  designed  to  test  for  this 
would  be  expected  to  generate  consistent  results  across  these  sub-samples. 
Accordingly,  we  test  for  this  in  each  of  the  models  that  we  present  below.  The 
hypothesis of uniform coefficients across groups is strongly rejected in every case 
using a standard F test, while the individual parameters point to the sources of this 
instability. A chow test for stability of coefficients across groups of firms within each 




                                                 
12 For both equations for both countries, random the random effects estimator rejects the restriction of 
fixed effects. 
Comment [ND1]:   
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section we present and analyse the 3SLS estimates of the most parsimonious 
leverage and profit margin equations (4) and (5), allowing for simultaneity and non-
linearity.  
In order to address the problem of close association, we first started with the 
individual  effects  of  the  available  ownership  variables,  namely,  ownership 
concentration (Concen), Cronyman (Crony), family ownership (Famown) and higher 
voting rights (Voting). These results are summarised in Appendix Table A1 for the 
two sample countries. We then controlled for interaction between Famown and Crony 
as well as that between Famown and Concen. The pooling of different types of firms 
(family and others) may still bias the effects of ownership if the family firms are run 
differently from others. This is further justified by the significant instability of the 
coefficients for family and other types of firms. We therefore conclude that the best 
way to resolve this problem is to consider the effects of concentration of ownership 
for various sub-samples of firms characterised by differential ownership pattern. In 
particular, we distinguish between: (a) firms with/without family ownership; (b) firms 
with/without family ownership along with the presence of a Cronyman. Whether a 
firm is family owned or not and whether the firm has a Cronyman are quite important 
in our analysis. This is because the incentive effects are likely to be much stronger if 
the manager-shareholder is part of the family (CRONFAM=1), which is the dominant 
group in our sample. In contrast, a particular subgroup of CRONFAM=0, i.e., those 
with FAMOWN=0 and CRONYMAN=1,  comes closest to the common manager-
shareholder in standard models including Bajaj et al. (1998).  Thus a comparison of 
the effects of concentration and higher voting rights on leverage and firm performance 
in these two groups of firms, namely, CRONFAM=1, 0, would allow us to capture the 
differential effects of managerial shareholding in these family-owned and other firms. 
We believe that this is a better way of disentangling the effects of ownership structure 
on firm financing and performance in our samples. 
Having  tested  for  various  alternative  combinations  of  ownership  variables 
(after controlling for all other factors as well) for the full sample and also for the 
relevant sub-samples (Famown=0, 1; Cronfam
13=0, 1), we find that 3SLS estimates 
                                                 
13 Note that this category is created by taking account of the interaction between family ownership 
(Famown=0, 1) and presence of a Cronyman (Cronyman=0,1) and is labelled as Cronfam=1,0. Clearly.  
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are robust as well as stable for various sub-samples while those for the full sample are 
not. We thus chose to focus on the 3SLS Estimates for two categories, namely, family 
firms  with  presence  of  a  Cronyman  (Cronfam=1)  and  also  non-family  firms 
with/without a Cronyman (Cronfam=0). We also compare these estimates with family 
(Famown=1)  and  non-family  owned  (Famown=0)  firms  and  found  that  effects  of 
ownership concentration and higher voting rights are rather similar for family firms 
and family firms with Cronyman (Cronfam=1). Likewise, we obtained similar effects 
of  ownership  among  non-family  firms  (Famown=0)  and  also  non-family  firms 
with/without Cronyman (Cronfam=0). For each subsample of firms, we examine the 
effects of ownership concentration and degree of monitoring (i.e., effect of the binary 
variable  voting)  on  leverage  and  firm  performance  indicator.  These  estimates  are 
summarised in Table 5A while Table 5B highlights the central results of our interest 
corresponding  to  the  variables  indicating  ownership  concentration  and  degree  of 
monitoring. We also compare these 3SLS estimates with the corresponding single 
equation estimates (see Table 6) and examine the relative efficiency of 3sls estimates 
vis-à-vis the single-equation fixed-effects estimates.  
 
5.1. Effects of ownership structure 
The dominant category in our samples is family firms with a Cronyman (famown=1 
and crony=1), accounting for some 67% of Indonesian and 60% of Korean firms. 
Higher ownership concentration is associated with higher leverage among this group 
of firms, confirming the general theoretical predictions of Bajaj et al for any firms 
with a manager-shareholder. The effect of ownership concentration on profitability  
however seem to differ from the theoretical prediction of Bajaj et al, depending on the 
sub-sample considered for a given country and also between countries of our choice. 
Concentration exerts a positive effect of profitability (though insignificant) for Korea 
(conforms to the theoretical prediction), while the result is negative and significant for 
Indonesia. This suggests that the productivity and risk aversion effects outweigh each 
other for the Korean sample, while the risk aversion effect dominates the productivity 
                                                                                                                                            
Cronfam=1 when Famown=1 and Cronyman=1. But Cronfam=0 includes three subgroup of firms: (a) 
Famown=0 and Cronyman=0;(b) Famown=1 and Cronyman=0 and (c) Famown=0 and Cronyman=1. It 
could however be noted that most firms in this subgroup fall in the sub-category (a) in both sample 
countries. Thus Cronfam=0 constitutes our reference category of non-family owned firms.  
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effect  in  Indonesia.  This  result  may  be  due  to  the  generally  higher  levels  of 
concentration in Indonesia compared with Korea. 
  Bajaj et al. (1998) predicts that the degree of moral hazard for the manager 
shareholder  is  positively  related  to  leverage  while  inversely  related  to  firm 
performance. Since  higher  voting  (relative  to  cash  flow)  rights  are  taken  to be  a 
measure of moral hazard, we expect the voting variable to have a positive effect on 
leverage and negative effect  on profit  margin.  Any observed  relationship  is again 
however the result of two underlying effects: incentive effects (managers gain from 
better performance) and entrenchment effects (managers seek to prevent dilution of 
their control, and therefore seek to maintain high levels of leverage irrespective of 
performance.  The  results  presented  here  suggest  that  voting  has  little  impact  on 
performance (as well as leverage) in Korea, such that the incentive and entrenchment 
effects outweigh each other. Voting concentration in Indonesia has a negative effect 
however  on  leverage  (incentive  effects  being  greater)  and  but  no  effect  on  profit 
margins, again suggesting that the two effects outweigh each other. In other words, 
degree of moral hazard (as proxied by higher voting rights) has limited impact on 
leverage or performance among family firms, suggesting that family ownership may 
mitigate some of the moral hazard problems generated by higher voting than cash 
flow rights. This may reflect the fact that in many cases managers are themselves the 
members of  the  owner’s family  and  may  therefore not  suffer from  the traditional 
conflict  of  interests  (and  directly  gain  from  better  firm  performance).  This  is  an 
extension of central result of Bajaj et al. (1998). 
  Turning now to the analysis of the rest of the firms (Cronfam=0), we find that 
this group consists of 3 sub-groups:  
(a) Family owned, but does not have a Cronyman : there are only 7 Indonesian 
firms and 20 Korean firms in this category;  
(b) Not family owned, but has a Cronyman: there are only 1 Indonesian firms 
and 15 Korean firms in this category.  
c) Neither family owned nor has a Cronyman: there are 22 Indonesian firms 
and 20 Korean firms.  
  The majority of firms in this category are thus neither family-owned nor has a 
controlling  manager.  We  also  note  that  estimates  for  this  category  (Cronfam=0) 
closely resembles estimates for non-family owned firms. As expected, the effect of 
concentration on leverage is positive and significant in both countries. There is also  
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some evidence of entrenchment effects in that concen>50% has a positive effect on 
leverage in Korea (but not in Indonesia). More interestingly, for these firms higher 
voting  rights  have  significant  effects  on  both  leverage  and  profit  margin  in  both 
countries, though again the estimate are of opposite sign in the two countries of our 
choice: both coefficients are positive in Korea while both are negative in Indonesia. In 
particular, the effect of voting on profit margin in Indonesia is compatible with the 
prediction of Bajaj et al., but that for Korea is not. The latter may reflect the lower 
average level of ownership concentration in Korea, such that higher voting rights in 
Korea appear to be associated with greater incentive effects (relative to entrenchment 
effects).  As  a  result,  higher  voting  than  cash  flow  rights  may  improve  firm 
performance in the Korean subsample.  
Thus there is evidence that, unlike Claessens et al. (2002), our results vary 
between the two sample countries (with different institutional/legal framework) and 
perhaps  question  the  basis  of  pooling  of  firms  in  different  countries.  Estimates 
presented here also demonstrate that the effect of ownership concentration on leverage 
is  similar  between  family  and  non-family  firms  such  that  higher  levels  of 
concentration are associated with higher leverage. However, these two groups of firms 
appear to behave differently with respect to higher voting rights. While higher voting 
rights are unrelated to performance in family owned firms in both countries, these 
seem to matter significantly (albeit of different signs for the two countries) for the 
non-family owned firms. We argue that this difference reflects the fact that family 
ownership on its own can mitigate some of the problems of moral hazard that non-
family owned firms cannot.  
 
 
5.2. Simultaneity between capital structure and firm performance   
There is also evidence of simultaneity between leverage and firm performance in our 
model. Irrespective of the choice sub-group, higher profit margin raises relative debt 
levels in Indonesia, but reduces them in Korea. There is also some evidence of non-
linearity observed
14 in this relationship for both countries. These results suggest that 
                                                 
14 There is also some difference in the nature of nonlinearity.  The result is saying that leverage declines at a 
more than linear rate in Korea as profit increases. This is different from Indonesia, where a turning point can be 
identified, i.e., the two profit terms have opposite signs.  
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the substitution effect (against equity capital) is greater for more efficient firms in 
Indonesia, the income effect is relatively greater for Korean firms (see discussion in 
section 3).
15 There is also some evidence of reverse causality though it’s somewhat 
weaker in that it does not hold for all the subgroups considered. Higher absolute levels 
of debt are associated with higher profit margins in family-owned Indonesian firms 
with a Cronyman, and lower profit margins among Korean firms with Cronfam=0. 
This may be a result of the greater average levels of leverage in Korea (see Table 3), 
such that further increases in debt may result in lower efficiency. This occurs because 
the  benefits  of  reduced  agency  costs  of  outside  equity  are  outweighed  by  greater 




6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
While many recent studies have highlighted the role of corporate governance on the 
recent Asian crisis (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000, 2002), effects of corporate governance 
(as  reflected  in  the  ownership  structure)  of  these  Asian  corporations  on  capital 
structure and firm performance remains much unexplored. The present paper departs 
from  this  literature  and  attempts  to  disentangle  the  complex  relationship  between 
ownership structure, capital structure and firm performance in a world characterised 
by  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard.  In  doing  so  it  also  takes  account  of  the 
possible  simultaneity  and  non-linearity  between  capital  structure  and  firm 
performance, much overlooked in the existing studies.  
Results obtained from 1994-98 panel data drawn from a sample of Indonesian 
and Korean firms are supportive of a significant simultaneity between capital structure 
and  firm  performance.  After  allowing  for  this  simultaneity,  higher  ownership 
concentration  is  associated  with  higher  leverage  irrespective  of  whether  a  firm  is 
family owned or not. But the effects of higher control rights on leverage and profit 
margin depend on whether a firm is family owned or not. While higher voting rights 
                                                                                                                                            
 
15 While profit margin affects capital structure in a non-linear way, there is however no evidence of 
non-linearity in the effect of capital structure on profit margin in our samples. Hence, we do not include 
the non-linear term in the profit function.  
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turn out to be insignificant among family firms, these significantly affect leverage and 
profit margin among non-family owned firms. We thus argue that family ownership 
could somewhat mitigate the moral hazard problem though it could still exacerbate 
the problem of over-lending.   
The subsequent recovery of many East Asian Corporations in the Millennium 
has revived the search for appropriate institutional reforms in order to regain its pre-
crisis dynamism and strength. If there is one lesson to be learnt from the last Crisis, it 
is that  these  corporations  have  become  over-reliant  on  debt,  this  in  part  being  a 
function of the prevailing ownership structures. One must therefore question whether 
firms  in  these  countries  will  be  able  to  maintain  their  robust  patterns  of 
recovery unless  they  reduce  their  leverage  by  going 
directly to capital markets rather than to banks. Of course East Asian countries will 
gain little by physically dismantling large family owned businesses. What is needed at 
this stage is the strengthening of bank-based corporate governance and other legal and 
judicial  reforms  that  will  improve  the  transparency  and  accountability  of  these 
enterprises and better protection of minority shareholders.    
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  TABLES 
Table 1A. Ownership Structure 
 
     
  Korea  Indonesia 
% of total firms with Concentration     
>50%  6  47 
25%- 50%  45  50 
<25%  49  3 
Highest level of concentration  63%  73% 
     
Cronyman =1     
% total firms  69  69 
% of family owned firms out of firms with cronyman =1  86  98 
     
Voting=1     
% of total firms  25  54 
% of firms with cronyman =1 out of firms with voting =1  90  92 
% of firms with Concen>50% out of firms with voting =1  8  49 
     
Family Ownership     
% of total firms with family ownership  79  75 
 
Table 1B. Correlation between ownership variables  
 
  Korea 
  CRONY  VOTING  FAMOWN  CONCEN 
CRONY  1.00000       
VOTING  0.44826  1.00000     
FAMOWN  0.93134  0.44379  1.00000   
CONCEN  0.71136  0.42993  0.71968  1.0000 
  Indonesia 
CRONY  1.00000       
VOTING  0.93719  1.00000     
FAMOWN  0.50002  0.48555  1.0000   
CONCEN  0.47657  0.47679  0.94905  1.00000 
 
These correlation coefficients illustrate the problem that one encounters in attempting 
to include all of these variables in an equation together. These are the correlation 
coefficients for the transformed data, allowing the covariance between the equations, 
based on the full sample estimates. They are higher than for the raw data, but the signs 
remain consistent.  
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Table 2A. Proportion of low-leverage firms    
 
Period  Indonesia  Korea  Singapore 
1993  0.68  0.17  0.87 
1994-96  0.59  0.22  0.84 
1997-98  0.28  0.21  0.76 
Note: A low-leverage firm is defined as a firm with |DE|<1 
 
Table 2B. Capital Structure 
 
Korea  Period   %  of  the 
total Firms 
Proportion  of 










Low Debt  1993  0.18  0.04  0.60  0.60 
  1994-96  0.22  0  0.45  0.71 
  1997-98  0.22  0.01  0.53  0.57 
  1994-98  0.22    0.54  0.64 
High Debt  1993  0.82  0.02  4.9  29.3 
  1994-96  0.78  0.01  4.18  27.5 
  1997-98  0.78  0.13  7.37  11.8 
  1994-98  0.78  0.08  5.61  13.1 
           
Indonesia           
Low Debt  1993  0.45  -  0.37  - 
  1994-96  0.52  -  0.46  - 
  1997-98  0.29  -  0.46  - 
  1994-98  0.47  -  0.46  - 
High Debt  1993  0.55  -  1.28  - 
  1994-96  0.48  -  1.52  - 
  1997-98  0.71  0.14  6.1  8.22 
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Table 3. Effects of ownership structure on leverage and firm performance 
 
Korea  |ABDE|  Π  |ABDE|  Π  |ABDE|  Π 
  Concen<25%  25%<= Concen >=50%  Concen>50% 
1994-96  3.85  0.09  2.77  0.10  4.98  0.12 
1997-98  5.03  -0.05  5.79  -0.03  2.13  0.08 
  Famown=1    Famown=0       
1994-96  3.24  0.09  3.53  0.11     
1997-98  4.41  -0.02  6.05  -0.01     
  Voting=1    Voting =0       
1994-96  2.97  0.09  3.56  0.10     
1997-98  4.73  -0.01  5.31  -0.04     
  Cronyman=1  Cronyman =0     
1994-96  3.55  0.09  2.99  0.10     
1997-98  4.79  -0.05  6.24  0.00     
 
Indonesia  |ABDE|  Π  |ABDE|  Π  |ABDE|  Π 
  Concen<25%  25%<=Concen >=50%  Concen>50% 
1994-96  0.97  0.19  1.29  0.18  0.78  0.17 
1997-98  10.38  -0.19  2.77  -0.20  5.50  0.10 
  Famown=1    Famown=0       
1994-96  0.90  0.18  0.82  0.18     
1997-98  8.77  -0.07  5.17  0.04     
  Cronyman =1  Cronyman =0     
1994-96  0.91  0.18  0.80  0.18     
1997-98  8.70  -0.07  6.49  0.03     
  Voting=1    Voting =0       
1994-96  0.89  0.18  0.85  0.18     
1997-98  9.84  -0.16  5.23  0.10     
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  Specification (1) 
Firm size (SALES)  √  √ 
Age of the firm (AGE)  √  √ 
Tobin’s Q (LAGQ)  √  √ 
Diversification (DIVER)  √  √ 
Voting  (VOTING)  √  √ 
Family ownership (FAMOWN)  √  √ 
Profit margin (Π)  √  × 
Square of profit margin (Π
2)  √  × 
Absolute leverage (ABDE)  ×  √ 
  Specification (2) 
Firm size (SALES)  √  √ 
Age of the firm (AGE)  √  √ 
Tobin’s Q (LAGQ)  √  √ 
Diversification (DIVER)  √  √ 
Voting  (VOTING)  √  √ 
Concentration (CONCEN)  √  √ 
Concentration > 50%  √  × 
Profit margin (Π)  √  × 
Square of profit margin (Π
2)  √  × 
Absolute leverage (ABDE)  ×  √ 
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 Table 5A. 3SLS estimates of the determinants of leverage and profit margin 
 
  Indonesia  Korea 
  Cronfam =1  cronfam=0  cronfam=1  cronfam=0 
Determinants of leverage 
Parameter  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat 
C  3.589  2.80  9.590  3.42  5.597  2.01  3.064  0.88 
SALES  -0.0185  -2.45  -0.002  -2.48  -0.005  -1.72  -0.032  -0.91 
AGE  0.0408  0.08  -0.591  -3.05  -0.764  -2.74  -0.314  -0.29 
QLAG  -1.871  -3.72  0.559  0.52  -0.570  -3.17  -0.124  -2.49 
PROFIT  0.205  4.87  0.309  2.93  -2.641  8.81  -1.674  -2.94 
PROFIT
2  -1.678  -3.90  -1.015  -2.01  2.229  0.63  -4.070  -3.88 
DIVER  -0.241  -2.91  -0.439  -2.46  -4.579  -1.95  -2.422  -2.78 
CONCEN  0.371  3.00  0.332  1.65  0.512  3.12  0.374  2.78 
CONCEN 
>50% 
0.578  1.21  0.280  2.43  0.270  0.99  1.731  4.81 
voting  -0.308  -4.40  -0.168  -2.18  0.421  0.75  0.421  2.06 
R
2  0.647  0.631  0.642  0.573 
AR(1)  2.897 (p=0.088)  2.364 (0.124)  2.488  (0.115)  2.000  (0.157) 
Sargan : p 
value 
0.214  0.356  0.269  0.200 
SSR  165894  360556  46341  137542 
Chow (F stat)  2.955 (p=0.031)  11.551 (p=0.000) 
Determinants of profitability 
C  -0.0653  -5.19  -0.332  -1.62  -0.285  -0.85  0.332  1.52 
SALES  .000003  10.46  0.00001  2.29  0.00000  0.28  0.00001  -3.26 
AGE  0.001  3.07  0.004  3.03  -0.002  -1.68  0.0002  2.50 
QLAG  0.417  6.06  0.228  3.49  0.105  6.81  0.042  2.82 
ABDE  0.002  2.06  0.002  0.61  -0.001  -0.82  -0.0001  -2.32 
DIVER  0.460  3.92  0.119  0.87  0.195  3.82  -0.289  -1.43 
CONCEN  -0.003  -4.67  -0.002  -2.84  0.002  2.89  0.0001  0.25 
voting  -0.002  -1.03  -0.169  -5.97  0.011  1.16  0.037  3.44 
R
2 (adj)  0.583  0.496  0.426  0.513 
AR(1)  1.2474 (0.264)  1.010  (0.314)  1.270  (0.259)  0.988 (0.520) 
Sargan : p 
value 
0.154  0.136  0.198  0.207 
         
SSR  76.17  21.42  847.189  132.283 
Chow (F stat)  12.281 (p=0.000)  2.607 (p=0.048) 
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Table 5B. Effects of ownership on leverage and profit margin 
 
    Indonesia    Korea   
    Leverage  Pftmgn  Leverage  Pftmgn 
           
Famown=0  Concen  +ve **  -ve **  +ve **  +ve  
  Concen>50%  +ve *    +ve **   
  Voting  -ve *  +ve  +ve **  +ve ** 
           
Famown=1  Concen  +ve **  -ve **  +ve *  +ve * 
  Concen>50%  +ve     -ve   
  Voting  -ve *  +ve  +ve  +ve 
           
Crony*Famown=1  Concen  +ve **  -ve **  +ve **  +ve 
  Concen>50%  +ve     +ve   
  Voting  -ve *  -ve  +ve  +ve 
           
Crony*Famown=0  Concen  +ve **  -ve **  +ve **  +ve  
  Concen>50%  +ve *    +ve **   
  Voting  -ve *  +ve  +ve *  +ve *  
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Table 6. Single Equation Estimates  
 
  Indonesia  Korea 
  Cronfam =1  cronfam=0  cronfam=1  cronfam=0 
Determinants of leverage 
Parameter  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat 
C  3.042  3.053  11.271  2.99  5.077  2.02  2.608  0.96 
SALES  -0.0217  -2.64  -0.002  -2.90  -0.006  -2.03  -0.038  -0.73 
AGE  0.037  0.09  -0.485  -2.94  -0.888  -2.72  -0.251  -0.23 
QLAG  -1.889  -3.86  0.585  0.62  -0.657  -3.54  -0.134  -2.50 
PROFIT  0.189  4.01  0.265  3.26  -2.294  8.53  -1.86  -2.97 
PROFIT
2 
-1.756  -3.84  -1.190  -1.76  1.865  0.70  -4.074  -3.71 
DIVER  -0.257  -1.90  -0.407  -1.52  -5.209  -1.90  -1.865  -1.65 
CONCEN  0.462  2.00  0.263  0.83  0.652  1.70  0.188  2.31 
CONCEN 
>50%  0.484  0.652  0.183  1.67  0.201  1.01  1.698  2.88 
Voting  -0.306  -3.96  -0.138  -2.02  0.333  0.72  0.406  2.14 
R
2  0.670  0.701  0.770  0.681 
AR(1) (p 
value) 
1.584 (0.208)  1.621 (0.203)  1.307 (0.253)  1.006 (0.316) 
SSR  122480  118130  269259  176886 
Chow (F stat)  2.567 (p=0.011)  3.306  (p=0.001) 
Determinants of profitability 
C  -0.073  -5.99  -0.37  -1.47  -0.26835  -0.68  0.320  1.56 
SALES  0.00001  12.03  0.00001  2.50  0.00003  0.26  0.00001  -3.54 
AGE  0.001  3.16  0.004  3.18  -0.00178  -1.38  0.0002  2.48 
QLAG  0.439  5.18  0.240  3.89  0.09946  6.16  0.037  2.63 
ABDE  0.002  2.17  0.002  0.69  -0.00101  -0.71  -0.00001  -2.02 
DIVER  0.181  2.04  0.057  0.34  0.137  3.85  -0.348  -0.96 
CONCEN  -0.002  -6.37  -0.002  -1.53  0.001  2.34  0.00000  0.27 
Voting  -0.001  -0.80  -0.114  -3.51  0.013  0.54  0.049  2.70 
R
2   0.547  0.550  0.506  0.538 
AR(1)  1.001 (0.317)  0.923 (0.337)  0.985 (0.321)  0.966 (0.327) 
         
SSR  28.148  16.279  35.289  38.271 
Chow (F stat)  3.197  (p=0.002)  3.031 (0.003) 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Individual effects of ownership variables: Indonesia (Full sample) 
 
Parameter  Estimate  t-statistic  Estimate  t-statistic  Estimate  t-statistic
INTERCEPT  32.436  3.37  3.63  3.35  32.769  3.39 
SALES  -.0269  -2.57  -.005  -2.04  -.0225  -2.37 
AGE  -.484  -2.65  -.170  -1.05  -.590  -2.91 
QLAG  -.591  -3.26  -.799  -2.82  -.476  -3.10 
PROFIT  1.005  3.91  .586  2.46  1.014  4.26 
PROFIT
2  -1.267  -.61  -.488  -2.02  -13.536  -.63 
DIVER  -2.366  -3.16  -.204  -3.13  -2.127  -3.18 
VOTING  1.909  -2.31         
CONCEN      .373  2.66     
CONCEN>50%      -.241  -3.17     
FAMOWN          .088  -2.56 
CRONY             
R
2 (adj)  0.699276  0.675427  0.634329
AR(1)  2.088243  1.898301  2.166157
Sargan   0.167805  0.146644  0.174019
SSR  334968.4  368259.9 
             
INTERCEPT  -1.759  -3.58  -.099  -1.61  -1.766  -3.46 
SALES  .0001  2.21  .0001  9.22  .0001  2.10 
AGE  .004  4.13  .004  11.44  .004  4.10 
QLAG  .228  2.82  .107  3.44  .167  2.33 
ABDE  .005  2.34  .0001  .12  .005  2.28 
DIVER  1.241  3.34  .044  .69  1.194  3.30 
VOTING  -.043  -4.92         
CONCEN      -.238  -6.13     
FAMOWN          -.088  1.52 
CRONY             
R
2 (adj)  0.56206  0.514353  0.489195
AR(1),  0.92329  1.016725  0.905386
Sargan.  0.175022  0.170521  0.194108
SSR  79.36632  78.23535  76.38398
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Table A1. Individual effects of ownership variables: Korea (Full sample, 
continued) 
 
Parameter  Estimate  t-statistic  Estimate  t-statistic  Estimate  t-statistic
INTERCEPT  1.48035  1.83315  1.58176  1.62266*  1.48244  1.87569
SALES  -.218209E-02  -1.26822  -.414181E-03  -2.258251**  -.387869E-03  -.303576
AGE  -.167064  -.458216  -1.63361  -1.32439  .484350  1.39757
QLAG  -.177400  -1.57556  -.107824  -1.17384  -79.5936  -1.24134
PROFIT  -4.99520  -2.34495  -6.90923  -3.66226**  -4.99736  -2.35732
PROFIT
2  -1.25455  -1.40417  -2.16171  -2.31388**  -1.25642  -1.43344
DIVER  -1.17012  -1.79355  -1.38364  -1.59529*  -1.12849  -1.83369
VOTING  3.66913  1.58548         
CONCEN      .50970  2.84671**     
CONCEN>50%      -.36687  -2.14111**     
FAMOWN          -.709045  -1.80553
CRONY             
R
2 (adj)  0.697509    0.671974    0.604 
AR(1)  1.963531    2.070687    1.796172 
Sargan   0.20909    0.216605    0.203312 
SSR  422370.3    447010.7    470767 
             
INTERCEPT  .870676  3.35091  .282483  4.60438**  .884968  3.45310
SALES  .359141E-05  3.97615  .111792E-06  .251409  .448968E-05  5.30921
AGE  -.946420E-03  -4.10557  -.132007E-02  -8.89418**  -.669524E-03  -3.54389
QLAG  -.107645  -2.22967  -.014768  -.903255  -.068454  -3.96979
ABDE  -.594211E-03  -3.49652  -.187184E-03  -1.05656  -.601226E-03  -3.52525
DIVER  -.674990  -3.14397  -.186541  -3.11379**  -.663519  -3.24372
VOTING  .841933E-02  4.88372         
CONCEN      .656223E-03  3.67343**     
FAMOWN          -.036389  -2.56439
CRONY             
R
2 (adj)  0.585721    0.56796    0.518865 
AR(1)  0.910132    0.970598    1.033631 
Sargan   0.268114    0.295444    0.263484 
SSR  58.44507    60.40913    61.46692 
 